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Аннотация: Регион, который в советское время назывался Советской Средней Азией, 
включает в себя 5 бывших советских центрально-азиатских республик (ЦАР): Казахстан, 
Узбекистан, Туркменистан, Таджикистан и Кыргызстан. После распада Советского Союза 
в 1991 г. их политический статус резко изменился. Они стали независимыми республи-
ками. С начала 1990-х гг. лидеры стран Центральной Азии иногда называют соседний 
Афганистан шестой центрально-азиатской республикой. Фактически, он занимает 14 % 
бассейна Аральского моря, в его горах формируется около 15 % стока реки Амударья, ко-
торая является крупнейшей рекой в Центральной Азии и впадает в Аральское море.
Ключевые слова: Центральная Азия, Россия, Китай, США, ЕС
Для цитирования: Глянц М.Г. Большая игра в Большой Центральной Азии. Проблемы 
постсоветского пространства. 2019;6(3):238-243. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24975/2313-
8920-2019-6-3-238-243
Статья поступила: 23.06.2019 
Принята в печать 28.08.2019 
Опубликована 117.09.2019
A Great Game in Greater Central Asia
Michael H. Glantz
University of Colorado at Boulder, USA 
glantz@ucar.edu 
Abstract: The region historically referred to as Soviet Central Asia includes the 5 Central Asian 
Republics (CARs) of the Former Soviet Union (FSU): Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Their political status changed drastically when the Soviet Union 
collapsed in 1991 and they became independent republics. Since the early 1990s, Central Asian 
leaders have referred on occasion to neighboring Afghanistan as the sixth CAR. In fact, it does 
occupy 14% of the Aral Sea Basin and its mountains supply about 15% of streamflow to the 
region’s mighty Amu Darya River that used to flow into Central Asia’s Aral Sea.
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INTRODUCTION
Before the Soviet collapse, the CARs of 
the USSR were little known to the West, rel-
atively speaking, and had been more or less 
off limits to foreigners. The region drew con-
siderable environmental interest and elevated 
international status, because the Aral Sea was 
rapidly shrinking in the last few decades of the 
20th century. The shrinking of the sea was the 
result of deliberate river diversions from the 
sea’s two major rivers, the Amu Darya and 
the Syr Darya. The diversions were officially 
sanctioned by the Soviet Politburo and later 
by the independent CARs to use river water 
on fertile but dry desert sands, mainly to grow 
cotton. The Aral Sea was the fourth-largest in-
land sea in the world in the 1970s but today it 
has almost disappeared.
The Central Asian region has now become 
a political playing field for global as well as 
regional powers, even though Russia consid-
ers its former Central Asia Republics as within 
its sphere of influence. Regional powers in-
cluding China, India, Pakistan, Iran and Rus-
sia (along with the distant US) are vying for 
dominant influence in and over the CARs. It 
is fair to say that all these countries could be 
collectively labeled as «Greater Central Asia». 
Some of the 5 FSU republics are rich in hy-
drocarbons (oil, natural gas, coal resources), 
while others have mineral and water resources. 
Though they are at various levels of economic 
development, size, and population, and with 
different geographic features (desert, moun-
tain, glacial landscapes), they share a common 
political feature: each republic is landlocked. 
Idan [1] stated its significance in the following 
way:
The major geographic characteristic of the 
Central Asian countries established following 
the break-up of the Soviet Union is the fast 
that they are land-locked. This factor creates 
challenges in all spheres of development — 
foreign policy, security, and unique human 
development.
Idan quoted “Kazakhstan President Naz-
arbayev [who] stated … that the lack of access 
to the sea could be detrimental to the country’s 
economic development, and to its political in-
dependence, as well as making participation in 
international economic relations difficult”.
As for the sixth CAR, Afghanistan, the pro-
longed wars in that country have made it dif-
ficult to realize major involvement in regional 
transboundary infrastructure development 
plans, except for some notable projects with 
Uzbekistan [2].
Rehabilitating the existing infrastructure 
and modernizing it to meet contemporary 
needs is common and recognized as a neces-
sary key to national development as well as 
regional cooperation in a Greater Central Asia. 
Modernization would enhance the regional ex-
change of goods and services with neighbor-
ing as well as foreign markets, including those 
in China.
China’s step-like change in development 
interest and in expanding its socio-economic 
and political influence in the region can easily 
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be traced to President Xi’s OBOR/BRI. Each 
of these countries has received development 
loans from China through OBOR/BRI. It did 
so before OBOR/BRI was launched in 2013 
and has continued to make such loans today 
for infrastructure projects such as pipelines 
for natural gas and oil shipments to China, rail 
lines and roads for trade interactions, again 
with China, as well as with other countries. Ka-
zakhstan supplies oil to China, Turkmenistan 
provides natural gas to China, while others ex-
change their mineral resources for infrastruc-
ture development loans. Furukawa [3] noted 
that “Borrowing from Beijing has ballooned 
in all but…Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan”.
Idan identified some favorable aspects of 
China’s involvement in the region to promote 
connectivity [1]:
Connectivity is a factor able to change the 
geopolitical reality in a region whose geo-
graphic location is naturally constant.
China provided CA states with a regional 
largescale plan for connectivity within the re-
gion to neighboring countries, but especially 
to China.
The BRI integrates the countries of Central 
Asia with a new and multi-faceted transpor-
tation network, as well as connecting Central 
Asia to faraway countries and markets.
According to the BRI scheme, Central Asia 
becomes the main continental gateway for 
Chinese transportation routes westward.
Essentially, China is unlocking landlocked 
Central Asia… China’s BRI can transform 
Central Asia from its landlocked state to a 
transit region between Asia and Europe.
China has provided people-to-people ex-
changes with the CARs as part of its soft dip-
lomatic efforts to win over popular support 
and to dissuade local people from their fear of 
Chinas’s potential hegemony.
However, Idan also identified some worri-
some aspects of taking Chinese loans. “Cen-
tral Asian states are well aware of the prob-
lematic experiences of some countries with 
Chinese investments — the Hambantota port 
in Sri Lanka being the most notable example”. 
Each CAR has knowingly incurred varying 
levels of debt by the OBOR — related projects.
Comments by Furukawa [3] highlight con-
cerns about emerging as well as potential, debt 
traps for the five CARs. “As Beijing bankrolls 
projects in Central Asia to promote its Belt 
and Road Initiative, countries in the region are 
at risk of granting China valuable concessions 
to ease their heavy debt burdens. ”For exam-
ple, he noted “Tajikistan handed over a gold 
mine to China in April as remuneration for 
300 million dollars in funding to build a power 
plant” and that “Some predict that Turkmeni-
stan will have to hand over gas fields to China 
as repayment for its debts”.
Cohen [4] provided advice to Central Asian 
decision makers:
[W]hile the BRI can be a great facilitator for 
connectivity and development in the region, 
Central Asian countries must be active in the 
management of the belt and road projects pass-
ing through their territory if they hope to max-
imize local input — and impact…Participants 
of China’s BRI — particularly those which are 
overly dependent on China as a trade partner 
or creditor — run the risk of debt spirals and 
dangerous exposure to markets shocks. The 
Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, for example, 
respectively owe 40% and 50% of their public 
debt to China.
Cohen and Grant [5] suggested the follow-
ing to Central Asian government seeking Belt 
and Road loans from China.
Knowing about the debt trap, government 
must carefully consider the soft elements of 
their legal, regulatory, and fiscal infrastructure. 
How will the projects be structured? What will 
be the local content and labor requirements to 
foster the growth of human capital? What are 
the terms of debt and will the government have 
future capacity to repay it? Lastly, and perhaps 
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most importantly, are the ”rules” and “terms” 
of each infrastructure project transparent?”
KAIRAT MOLDASHEV’S “CONSTRUCTIVE 
CRITIQUE OF BRI FROM CENTRAL ASIA: A 
SUMMARY”
Researcher Moldashev [6] states in his arti-
cle, “Risks in the Implementation of the Belt 
and Road Initiative’ in Central Asia, «that 
“the “Belt and Road’ is a timely initiative for 
China and other Asian countries». Instead of 
widely — discussed geopolitical and econom-
ic implications of the BRI, his article focused 
on “other problems that may adversely affect 
the further development of this initiative: … 
issues of (1) sustainable development, (2) the 
absence of control by the PRC over possible 
corruption schemes in investment projects and 
(3) China’s domestic policy regarding national 
minorities.” He politely but repeatedly con-
cluded that “Insufficient attention to resolv-
ing these issues may slow down the process 
of projects implementation under the Chinese 
initiative in Central Asia in the future.”
While “The absence of clear legislative 
regulations imposing liability for corruption 
when investing outside the country, in a short- 
term perspective puts the Chinese investor 
in a preferential position” and while” at the 
moment, Central Asian countries are open to 
Chinese investments,… the medium — and 
long-term success of the “Belt and Road In-
itiative’ implementation in Central Asia will 
depend on many factors that must be consid-
ered by the Chinese side and the countries of 
Central Asia — recipients of investments from 
the PRC.” “Progress in the development of the 
“Belt and Road Initiative’ will depend on how 
far China can take action to solve the emerging 
problems and [ for their part] Central Asian 
states also need to develop standards for co-
operation with the PRC apart from economic 
indicators, pay[ing] more attention to environ-
mental and social issues”.
1. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: 
ENVIRONMENTAL MODERNIZATION ISSUES 
The growth of the Chinese economy, as in 
other industrializing countries, is accompa-
nied by environmental problems. Studies show 
that environmental modernization within Chi-
na, aimed at improving the environmental 
situation, was not reflected in the adjustment 
of investment activities outside the country. 
In addition, the government in underdevel-
opment and developing countries often low-
er environment standards to attract foreign 
investors, despite the fact that infrastructure 
projects (railways, roads, pipelines and power 
lines) usually carry risks of reducing biodiver-
sity, charge of ecosystem, and environmental 
pollution, during construction and exploitation.
For example, Tracy et al. [7] stated it this 
way: Concurrently, on the domestic front, the 
Chinese Government has launched a new pol-
icy paradigm, “ecological civilization”, to dra-
matically improve environmental regulations, 
reduce pollution, and transform industries by 
adopting new green technologies and higher 
environmental standards. But does China’s 
intention to go through a “green shift” domes-
tically resonate with these new trans-border 
infrastructure development mega-projects?
If China has only recently begun to discuss 
environmental issues at the highest level and 
to take serious measures, is it worth expecting 
that Chinese investors will more responsible 
for environmental issues in underdeveloped 
and developing countries? Risks in the imple-
mentation of the “Belt and Road Initiative” in 
Central Asia investments and for its own gov-
ernments in terms of environmental safety are 
inevitable.
2 CHINESE INVESTMENTS AND DOMESTIC 
POLICIES OF RECIPENT COUNTRIES
The absence of clear legislative regulations 
imposing liability for corruption when invest-
ing outside the country in a short-term perspec-
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tive puts the Chinese investor in a preferential 
position… But in the medium and long-term 
perspective. This strategy carries risks for Chi-
nese investors, including in the framework of 
“Belt and Road Initiative”. There are two rea-
sons for risks.
First, there is a risk now to become an object 
of discontent on the part of the societies of re-
cipient countries of investment. The existing 
sinophobic sentiments can be reinforced by 
the not-fully-responsible behavior of Chinese 
investors, which will create difficulties for the 
existing and future projects within the frame-
work of “Belt and Road Initiative.”
Secondly, regime change is always possible, 
and the new authorities might keep relations 
with China, but not share the enthusiasm of 
their predecessors. In Malaysia, after the de-
feat of the previous prime-minister Najib Tun 
Razak, accused of corruption, and the “Alli-
ance of Hope” coalition came to power, the 
state policy regarding Chinese projects also 
changed. The new government has already 
suspended two projects under the “Belt and 
Road Initiative”. The main reason [being] the 
increase in external debt.
“Environmental and other problems associat-
ed with Chinese investments, such as attract-
ing illegal labor or using only Chinese materi-
als, are not adequately addressed at this stage”.
3. CHINA’S NATIONAL MINORITY POLICY AND 
INVESTMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA
Central Asia is a key region for economic 
growth for Xinjiang and development of a land 
corridor between China and Western countries 
as an alternative to the sea routes.
In relations with the countries of Central 
Asia, one of the risk factors for the “Belt and 
Road Initiative” is the policy of the PRC re-
garding ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Ui-
ghur Autonomous Region. Although issues 
of domestic policy and investment are often 
considered separately, in the case of China’s 
policy on national minorities of the Xinjiang 
Uighur Autonomous Region…it already has 
negative impact on perception of China and 
“Belt and Road Initiative” by Central Asia. The 
mass media of Kazakhstan, broadcast in the 
Kazakh language, actively follow the process-
es in Xinjiang.
For the development of western China or 
Xinjiang, close cooperation with the countries 
of Central Asia, through which opens a land 
access to the markets of Russia, Iran and Eu-
rope, is very important. The developing Xin-
jiang also gets access to mineral resources 
in Central Asia. But in the past few years, an 
attempt to erase ethnic and religious identity 
and “sinification” of minorities can be seen 
in China’s domestic policy towards national 
minorities in Xinjiang [8]. What is happening 
does not quite correspond to the construction 
of a positive image of the PRC. The language 
of power, total control, the rejection of cultural 
diversity, an attempt to erase national identity, 
especially related to the societies of the people 
of Central Asia, creates an image of an aggres-
sive neighbor. Will this lead to an increase in 
conflict or end in cultural genocide?
“For any outcome, this process negatively 
impacts the perception of China, not only in 
Central Asia but throughout the world. The 
discourse of Hostility will significantly limit 
the possibilities for full-fledged economic co-
operation. Given that, national minorities in 
China, including the Uighurs, Kazakhs and 
Kyrgyz, could be a bridge in creating closer 
and more sustainable economic ties.
CONCLUSION
Furukawa [3] observed that “Moscow seems 
to tolerate China’s growing clout in Russia’s 
sphere of influence”. However, he also noted 
some Chinese activities could eventually un-
dermine its relationship with Russia because 
of its loans to the pro — West Ukraine and 
Moldova.
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